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Maritime Claims in the China Seas:
Current State Practices
CHOON-HO PARK*
In few other regions are coastal States' claims to maritime ju-
risdiction so varied as in East Asia. The geographical circum-
stances and the political relations among some of these States are
so complex that only a dozen countries bordering on the three
semi-enclosed China Seas share a cross-section of all issues
before the current UN Law of the Sea Conference. In this study,
the author comments on the practices of each coastal State with
reference to its territoria contiguous and economic jurisdictions,
and concludes with a summary of current and potential bilateral
and multilateral problems which the parties involved will have to
settle in due course.
FOREWORD
In the semi-enclosed China Seas, geographical circumstances
are so complicated that the adjacent and opposite States encoun-
ter a series of problems in the exercise of their maritime jurisdic-
tions. The situation is further exacerbated by the political
relations of these States, characterized by or originating from ide-
ological confrontations with which some of them have been ob-
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sessed for decades. This regional peculiarity is operative in the
formulation of their maritime policies, hence the variety in their
practices regarding the use of the sea.
In this study, the current practices of the coastal States are ob-
served with reference to their claims to territorial sea, contiguous
zone, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. Although
the China Seas are adjacent or contiguous to other waters, the ob-
servation here is confined to the three seas on which China bor-
ders, namely, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South
China Sea, while referring to marginal waters such as the Pohai
Bay, the Gulf of Tonkin and the Sunda Shelf where necessary.
Since China has the geographical advantage and is involved in all
the maritime problems in the region, the practices of each of the
other coastal States can be observed more easily by identifying
them in context, both in relation to other States and to China in
particular. In Part I, the national practices of China, North and
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines (in this
order) are briefly described; in Part II potential and actual dis-
putes between or among the adjacent and opposite States are
summarized. A sequel to this study will similarly cover Indone-
sia, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
I. State Practices
1. China
Territorial Sea: China declared its territorial sea to a limit of 12
nautical miles in September 1958.1 The declaration was partly
motivated by the need to strengthen its coastal defense, particu-
larly in connection with the situation around Quemoy and Matsu,
the mainland's two offshore islands under the control of Taiwan.2
For reasons of national security, therefore, "no foreign vessels for
military use and no foreign aircraft may enter China's territorial
sea and air space" without permission.3 China obviously re-
garded their passage as "prejudicial to its peace, good order and
security."4
For the delimitation of its territorial sea, China adopted the
straight baseline method5 but it neither specified the basepoints
nor gave publicity thereto. This has made it impossible for
1. For the English translation, see PEKiNG REVIEW, Sept. 9, 1958, at 21.
2. J. CoHEN & IL Cmru, PEopiL's CmiNA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, 469 (1974).
3. Territorial Sea Declaration, at para. 3.
4. Refer to the definition of innocent passage in the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, TJ.A.S. 5639
at art. 14(4) (1958).
5. Territorial Sea Declaration, at para. 2.
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outside observers to determine exactly where China's territorial
sea ends. A novel inclusion provided that straight baselines
would also apply to the Macclesfield Bank (the Zhongsha in Chi-
nese), a group of some 30 submerged coral outcrops situated in
the middle of the South China Sea and claimed by China for a
long time.6 This would mean, by implication, that the underwater
islands would also have a territorial sea of their own.
Military Zones: In 1955, when private fisheries associations of
China and Japan were negotiating a non-governmental agree-
ment, it became known that in 1950 (when the Korean War of
1950-1953 began), China proclaimed three military zones ex-
tending far beyond its territorial sea, one called the Military
Warning Zone in the northwestern part of the Yellow Sea and two
called the Military Navigation Zone and the Military Operation
Zone in the East China Sea. Two of them are believed to be in
force to date. The jurisdictional exclusivity and the spatial exten-
siveness of these maritime security zones are defined in various
ways.7
Continental Shelf and Economic Zone Claims: China has not
specified the outer limit of its continental shelf; the only official
position it has taken is to support delimitation of boundaries be-
tween adjacent and opposite States "through consultations" be-
tween the parties concerned, based on the natural prolongation of
land territory principle.8 China has been an active supporter of
the regime of an exclusive 200-mile economic zone (EEZ) from
the beginning, but it has not declared an EEZ of its own. Its re-
luctance to join the five "200-milers" of the region, including Tai-
wan, is understandable in view of the fact that it has so many
adjacent and opposite States with which to negotiate maritime
boundaries. In addition, China has territorial disputes with Ja-
pan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over the ownership of
offshore islands whose settlement is prerequisite to delimitation
of boundaries in the disputed waters. Here arises a practical
question: is it really necessary for China to settle maritime
6. See CHEN DONG-KANG, WOGUODE NANHAI ZUmAO 30-31 (2d ed. 1964). For
the English translation, 18-U.S. Jonr PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, 424 (1963).
7. See Park, China and Maritime Jurisdiction: Some Boundary Issues, 22
GERMAN Y.B. lVI'L L 124 (1979). For a map of the three military zones, see Park,
Fishing Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Fisheries Controversy, 2
OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.T. 93 (1974).
8. U.N. Seabed Committee Report, 3 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/9021
74 (1973).
boundary issues now with its neighbors, when resources are be-
ing developed in less controversial near-shore waters in any
event? Potential and current boundary and related territorial dis-
putes between China and its maritime neighbors are briefly de-
scribed in Part H below.
2. North Korea
Territorial Sea: Since the Pueblo incident of January 1968, 9
North Korea is known to claim a twelve mile limit of territorial
sea. Although information on its national maritime legislation is
not readily available to outside observers, it is generally assumed
that the claims are by and large security-oriented.
Military Boundary Zone: In July 1977, North Korea proclaimed
what it calls a fifty-mile military boundary zone, which came into
force simultaneously with its exclusive economic zone on August
1, 1977. In fact, not only was it declared "to reliably safeguard the
economic sea zone and firmly defend the national interests and
sovereignty of the country,"10 but also, in the Yellow Sea, its
outer limit was defined to coincide with that of North Korea's
EEZ at the median line. In terms of its exclusivity, therefore, the
military boundary zone amounts to an essentially territorial juris-
diction.
Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims: According to its official
statements, 1 North Korea would, like China, delimit the conti-
nental shelf between adjacent and opposite States "through con-
sultations"; unlike China, delimitation would be based on the
median-line principle. North Korea's EEZ came into force in Au-
gust 1977, extending "to the half-line of the sea in those waters
where the 200-mile economic sea zone cannot be established."12
For the delimitation of both continental shelf and EEZ between
adjacent and opposite States, therefore, North Korea would apply
the median-line principle, a position which conflicts with that of
China, as noted in Part 11(1) below.
3. South Korea
Territorial Sea: South Korea proclaimed its territorial sea to a
9. 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 756 (1968); 63 AD. J. INT'L L. 682 (1969) PROCEEDINGS, 63rd
ANNUAL CONFERENCE, AMERICAN SocmT OF INT'L L 2-30 (1969). For further de-
tails, see R. SmIsONDS, THE PUEBLO, EC-121, AND MAYAGUEZ INCIDENTS: SoMEs
CoNnNurriEs AND CHANGES, (Maryland U.L. School Occasional Paper No. 8, 1978).
10. For the English translation, see Park, The 50-Mile Military Boundary Zone
of North Korea, 72 Am. J. OF INT'L L. 866 (1978).
11. 2 THIRD U.N. LAw OF THE SEA CONFERENCE OmcrL RECORDS 162 para. 26
(1975).
12. 4 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE 2 (1977).
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limit of twelve miles for the first time in April 1978, and the enact-
ments in September of the same year.'3 The South Korean
claims are also strongly security-oriented, as may be seen from
the provision that, for reasons of national security, innocent pas-
sage of foreign ships may be suspended and that, in the case of
foreign warships and non-commerical vessels, a three-day notice
is required prior to their passage through the territorial sea of
South Korea. 14 It is also notable that, in the twenty-two and
three-quarter miles wide Western Channel of the Korea Straits,
the territorial sea does not extend beyond three miles from the
straight baseline,' 5 thereby leaving an 11.8 miles-wide corridor of
"high seas",16 Japan having done the same (but as a provisional
measure).
Special Maritime Zones: In 1972, South Korea set up two Spe-
cial Maritime Zones, one in the Yellow Sea and the other in the
Sea of Japan, in the name of the Regulations for the Safety of
Shipping Operations and, partly, for security reasons.'7 The
zones are intended, among other purposes, to protect South Kore-
an fishing vessels from being seized by North Korea.
Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims: The delimitation of the con-
tinental shelf by South Korea is based on the median-line princi-
ple toward China in the Yellow Sea and the natural prolongation
of land territory principle toward Japan in the East China Sea. A
serious continental shelf dispute has arisen involving China, Ja-
pan, North and South Korea and Taiwan, as noted in Part H'(2)
below. South Korea shared with China and Japan a degree of re-
luctance to declare an EEZ because of the boundary problems
that would have to be settled with these two countries and with
North Korea as well.' 8
13. For the Korean and English texts, see MINSTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TER-
RrrORIAL SEA LAW AND ITS ENACTMENT DECREES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1978).
14. Id. at art. 4.
15. Id. at art. 3.
16. R. SmrrH & R. HODGSON, NEW TERRITORIAL SEA LIMITS IN THE KOREA
STRAIrs 5 (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dep't of State, Rep. No. 998,
1978). For further details on the South Korean Law, see Park, South Korea and the
Law of the Sea, KOREAN INT'L L (Inst. of East Asian Studies, U. of Calif., Berke-
ley, to be published in 1981).
17. Park, The 50-Mile Military Boundary Zone of North Korea, 72 Am. J. INT'L
L. 866, 874 (1978).
18. For a hypothetical delimitation of maritime boundaries in Northeast Asia
see HYPOTHETICAL MARrmrE ZONES Or NORTHERN EAST ASIA, (Office of the Geog-
rapher, U.S. Dep't of State, Map No. 503591, 1977).
4. Japan
Territorial Sea: Japan adopted a three-mile limit as its territo-
rial sea in 1870 and adhered to it up until July 1977, when it was
extended to twelve miles.19 The extension was partly prompted
by domestic fishermen's pressure to exclude foreign-and partic-
ularly Korean and Russian-fishing within twelve miles of the
Japanese coast. Among the notable features in Japan's territorial
sea law is the provisional measure whereby, in five straits used
for international navigation (four of them less than twenty-four
miles wide), the limit still remains at three miles, marginally ex-
tending to twelve miles at some points. 20 Among other reasons,
the five "corridors" are known to have been provided for in order
to cope with a particularly sensitive issue in Japan. Under Ja-
pan's so-called "three principles of no nuclear weapons" (Hikaku
Sangensoku: not to keep, not to make, or not to admit nuclear
weapons), even the passage through Japanese territorial sea of
foreign nuclear warships would be in conflict with the principle
banning admission of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory.
200-Mile Fishing Zone: Simultaneously with the extension of its
territorial sea (July 1977), Japan also declared a 200-mile fishing
zone as a "provisional measure".21 The decision was made during
negotiations earlier in the year over Japanese fishing rights
within 200 miles of the Soviet Union, in order to enhance reciproc-
ity between the two States. Since Japan's fishing relations with
China, North Korea and South Korea are regulated by bilateral
agreements (on a non-governmental basis with North Korea), its
fishing zone in the west does not extend beyond its territorial
sea.22 Japan rightly fears that such an extension would en-
courage China and South Korea to declare their respective 200-
mile fishing or economic zones, to the disadvantage of Japanese
fishermen.
Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims: Japan has not defined the
outer limit of its continental shelf, but, for the delimitation of the
boundary in the East China Sea, it has persistently insisted on
the median-line principle, in contrast to China's and South Ko-
rea's adherence to the natural prolongation of land territory prin-
ciple (Part H1(2) below). With respect to the EEZ, Japan would
have to weigh carefully advantages and disadvantages from the
19. For the English text, see U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SE. B/19 (56-62, 1980).
20. Id. at supplementary provisions at para. 2(2). For further details, see
Yanai & Asomura, Japan and the Emerging Order of the Sea: Two Maritime Laws
of Japan, 21 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 48 (1977).
21. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SEE. B/19 (215-228, 1980).
22. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SEE. B/19 (Enforcement Order art 1 at 223-224, 1980).
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standpoint of its regional as well as its global interests. Under
current circumstances, however, Japan does not appear to be
pressed to make a hasty decision on its EEZ.
5. Taiwan
Territorial Sea: In September 1979, Taiwan extended the limit
of its territorial sea to twelve miles;23 until then, the limit was
three miles, which the Republic of China had adopted in 1930.
The extension, which was made, incidentally, on the occasion of
Taiwan's declaration of a 200-mile EEZ, is brief and unspecific on
baselines or other details.
Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims: On the basis of its constitu-
tion, Taiwan claimed jurisdiction over most parts of the East
China Sea continental shelf in 1970, applying the natural prolon-
gation of land territory principle (Part H1-2 below). In September
1979, as mentioned above, Taiwan also declared a 200-mile EEZ,24
motivated by the need to enhance its bargaining position with the
Philippines, which had put into effect a 200-mile EEZ in May of
the same year and begun to exclude Taiwanese fishermen from it
(Section 7 below). According to its declaration, Taiwan was to de-
termine its EEZ with opposite States "by agreement ... in ac-
cordance with generally accepted principles of international law
."; otherwise the declaration is brief and vague.25
6. Vietnam
Territorial Sea: In May 1977, Vietnam made a comprehensive
declaration of its maritime jurisdiction,26 which included the lim-
its of its territorial sea. Since North Vietnam had declared a
twelve-mile limit in 1964, this was probably a confirmation in the
name of the unified Vietnam. Mindful of the territorial disputes
with China and the Philippines over the ownership of the South
China Sea islands (Part H(4) below), the declaration specified
that "[t]he islands and archipelagoes, forming an integral part of
23. For the Chinese text, see CHUNGYANG JIPAO, Sept. 7, 1979, at 1. For the
English text, see COORDINATION COUNCIL FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS, PRESS RE-
LEASE, Sept. 7, 1979 (unpublished release on file with the East-West Center, Hono-
lulu, Hawaii).
24. CHUNGYANG JipAO, Sept 7, 1979 at 1.
25. Id at para. 2(2).
26. For the Vietnamese text, see NG. NG. MINH, LUAT BIEN (1977). For the
English text, see FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOm'ATION SERVICE KS, K6 (1977).
the Vietnamese territory . . ., have their own territorial seas,
.... ,,27 Presumably for the same reason, the declaration is
otherwise undetailed, especially with respect to basepoints.
Contiguous Zone: Vietnam also declared a twelve-mile contigu-
ous zone adjacent to its territorial sea,28 in which it was to exer-
cise "the necessary control... in order to see to its security and
[other] interests."
Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims: To define the outer limit of
its continental shelf, Vietnam relied on the lines of the 1976 Re-
vised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),29 i.e., with reference to
"the natural prolongation of the Vietnamese land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nauti-
cal miles .... "30 The 200-mile EEZ of Vietnam was also defined
on the basis of the 1976 RSNT. Disagreements on maritime juris-
diction with other countries were to be settled "through negotia-
tions".31 The boundary dispute with China in the Gulf of Tonkin
is discussed in Part H1(3) below.
7. The Philippines
Territorial Sea: The extent of the territorial sea claimed by the
Philippines in the name of the archipelago theory is based on lim-
its set forth in the 1898 Treaty of Paris whereby Spain ceded the
Philippines to the United States. The so-called Treaty Limits en-
closed a large rectangular expanse of the sea around the Philip-
pine archipelago, resulting in a land-to-water ratio of one to five.
The maximum distance between the baseline (defined in 1961)32
and the outer edge of the Treaty Limits in the northeast is ap-
proximately 285 miles.33
Continental Shelf and EEZ Claims: Jurisdiction over the conti-
nental shelf was proclaimed in 1968, based on the so-called ex-
ploitability test defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. The boundary between opposite States would
27. NG. NG. MimH, LUAT BIEN at para. 5 (1977).
28. For comparison with the security zones of China and North Korea, see
Park, China and Maritime Jurisdictiorn Some Boundary Issues, 22 GERmAN O3.
INT'L L. 124 (1979) and Park, The 50-Mile Military Boundary Zone of North Korea,
72 Au. J. IN'L L. 866 (1978).
29. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/WP.81 Rev. 11 part 11, art. 64 (1976).
30. Id. at para. 4.
31. Id. at para. 7.
32. Republic Act No. 3046 (1961), reprinted in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/15 at
105-111 (1970).
33. Limits in the Seas, The Philippines: Straight Baselines (Office of the Ge-
ographer, U.S. Dep't of State No. 33, 1971). See also Dellapenna, The Philippine
Territorial Water Claims in International Law, 5 J.L. AND ECON. DEV. 45 (1970).
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be determined "in accordance with legal and equitable princi-
ples".34 The Presidential decree on the 200-mile EEZ of the Phil-
ippines was signed in June 1978, but it was not put into force until
May 1979.35 The EEZ boundary between opposite States would
be determined "by agreement. . . or in accordance with pertinent
generally recognized principles of international law .... -36 The
territorial disputes with China and Vietnam, are discussed in Part
11(4) below.
I. Bilateral and Multilateral Issues
1. Between China and North Korea3 7
Both China and North Korea have made it clear that they
would determine their sea boundaries with adjacent and opposite
States "through consultations". In the northern Yellow Sea, how-
ever, North Korea has declared its EEZ and military boundary
zone "to the half-line of the sea". This is in conflict with the natu-
ral prolongation of land territory principle to which China would
adhere in the interest of consistency toward its other maritime
neighbors. In fact, China has persistently upheld this principle
for the delimitation of the East China Sea continental shelf. As
China and North Korea have reportedly not yet reached a bound-
ary agreement, it remains to be seen how they will eventually re-
solve the issue.
2. China, Japan and South Korea8
Sea boundary and related problems between these three
coastal States involve five parties, including North Korea and Tai-
wan, and are comprised of four separate issues. First, the bound-
ary issue between China and South Korea in the southern Yellow
Sea is basically similar to that between China and North Korea in
the northern Yellow Sea; the four South Korean sea-bed zones in
the southern Yellow Sea are also based on the median line to-
ward China.
34. Presidential Proclamation No. 370, reprinted in U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.
B/15 at 422 (1970).
35. Presidential Decree No. 1699, 65 PHILUPIN PRESIDENTIAL DECREES AND
OTHER VrrAL LEGAL DocUMENTs 33 (1978).
36. Id. at sec. 1.
37. Park, China and Maritime Jurisdictions: Some Boundary Issues, 22
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 136, 137 (1979).
38. Id. at 130-35.
Second, in the East China Sea, China insists on the natural pro-
longation of land territory principle toward Japan and South Ko-
rea, as does South Korea toward Japan, whereas Japan insists on
the median-line principle toward China and South Korea. None
of them is prepared to compromise its claims with the others.
Largely on account of the political relations between China and
South Korea, the three coastal States would also have difficulty in
even getting together for sea boundary or other negotiations.
Third, out of impatience over the deadlock, Japan and South
Korea did decide to put the boundary issue aside and develop oil
jointly in the East China Sea. The joint pact they signed in Janu-
ary 1974, against Chinese and North Korean protests, entered into
force in June 1978 and exploration began in late 1979.39
Fourth, in the southern East China Sea, the legal aspect of
China's boundary issue with Japan is similar to that with North
Korea in the northern Yellow Sea and to that with South Korea in
the southern Yellow Sea. The boundary issue has, however, given
rise to an extremely sensitive territorial dispute regarding the
ownership of eight uninhabited islands (the Senkaku in Japanese
and the Diaoyutai in Chinese) situated between China and Ja-
pan. The settlement of this territorial issue is prerequisite to the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the disputed waters.
3. Between China and Vietnam4o
In the Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam would would apply "the natural
prolongation of the Vietnamese land territory", whereas China
wishes to delimit the boundary "in a fair and reasonable way in
accordance with the relevant principles of present-day interna-
tional law of the sea." However, it is of interest to note that, in
the exploration contracts which China signed with western oil
companies in March and July 1979, the outer edge of China's oil
zones appears to approach the median line toward Vietnam.
4. Between China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam41
In the South China Sea, approximately 200 uninhabited islands
are grouped into four archipelagoes. The Pratas Reef (the Dong-
39. Id. at 134.
40. Id. at 137.
41. Id. at 127-30. For further details on the Chinese position, see Xizha and
Nansha Islands Belong to China, BEIJNG REVIEW, May 25, 1979, at 23-26; U.N. Doc.
A/34/712:S/13640 (1979), Some Documentary Evidence Showing That the
Vietnamese Government Recognized the Xisha and Nansha Islands as Chinese
Territory, submitted to the U.N. by the Permanent Representative of China on
Nov. 22, 1979; Doctrmnsr OF THE MImSRY OF FOREIGN AFFAils, Jan. 30, 1980,
China's Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands, reprinted in
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sha in Chinese) is under the control of Taiwan, with Chinese
ownership uncontested. The submerged Macclesfield Bank (the
Zhongsha in Chinese) is claimed by China, as noted above (see
Part I(1)), and is also uncontested. The Paracel Islands (the
Xisha in Chinese and the Haongsa in Vietnamese) have been
under Chinese control since January 1974, Wvhen, in a two-day
war, the Vietnamese were wiped off the islands by Chinese
forces. Vietnam continues to dispute Chinese ownership of the
islands. The Spratly Islands (the Nansha in Chinese, the
Truongsa in Vietnamese, the Kalayaan in Tagalog) are the larg-
est of the four groups and their ownership is claimed in whole by
China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, and in part by Ma-
laysia. With the exception of China and Malaysia, each claimant
is now in control of some of the islands. Furthermore, the Philip-
pines is reported to have confirmed the presence of oil in the
Reed Bank, situated in the northeast of the Spratly group. The
main basin of the South China Sea reaches a depth of over 3,000
meters; and this leads to technical difficulties in developing min-
eral resources from such depths. However, delimitation of sea
boundary, which is prerequisite to the development of resources,
will be delayed considerably in view of the territorial dispute be-
tween the four claimants. Because of the highly sensitive nature
of territorial disputes, therefore, the EEZ declarations of the Phil-
ippines, Taiwan and Vietnam are not clear or specific with respect
to their basepoints.
OBSERVATIONS
All the coastal States of the China Seas now claim the twelve
mile limit of territorial sea. In terms of exclusivity, however, their
claims vary widely. For instance, Japan defines the spatial extent
of its territorial sea in specific terms, but is silent on the legal
character of its jurisdiction. This is in contrast to the uncom-
monly exclusive claims of the other coastal States. The security
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE I, Jan. 30, 1980 at El-E18, in U.N. Doc.
A/35/93:S/13788 (1980) and in BELING REVIEW, Feb. 18, 1980, at 15-24.
For the Vietnamese position, see MnisTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON
THE HAONG SA (PARACEL) AND TRUONG SA (SPRATLY) ISLANDS (1975); NEAN DAN
(People), Sept. 29, 1979, at 34 and MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WE BOOK ON
VIETNAM'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE HAONG SA AND TRUONG SA ARCHIPELAGOES
(1979), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/34/541:S/13565 (1979).
zones of China, North Korea and Vietnam may also be noted for
their extensiveness and exclusivity.
The China Seas are all semi-enclosed and not wide enough for
the application of the 200-mile limit in full. The coastal States
that have adopted it, therefore, provide in their proclamations
that overlaps would be negotiated between the parties involved.
In this region, China and South Korea are now the only two
coastal States that have not yet joined the eighty-nine "200-mil-
ers" (as of March, 1981).42 Presumably, these two coastal States
with exceptionally complicated geopolitical circumstances would
prefer not to face prematurely the sea boundary issues that the
extended jurisdiction will give rise to.
In enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, the delimitation of boundary
is inherently a difficult undertaking, especially where the geo-
graphical circumstances are so complicated as in the China Seas.
In this particular region, however, the disputed ownership of off-
shore islands has made the boundary issues even more difficult to
settle. Natural resources are being explored for or developed,
therefore, mainly in waters close to the coast where the jurisdic-
tion is not subject to contest. The eventual conclusion of the Ca-
racas Convention on the Law of the Sea will likely provide a new
occasion for the coastal States to review their mutual problems
with reference to the new criteria.
42. SmIrm, NATIONAL MIARrTE CLAIMs, Limits in the Seas No. 36-4th Revision
(Office of the Geographer, Dep't of State, 1981).
